Stephen Salkever shows that reading Aristotle is a starting point for discussing contemporary political problems in new ways that avoid the opposition between liberal individualism and republican communitarianism, between the politics of rights and the politics of virtues. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in (...) durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

It is considered in some quarters that hypothesis‐driven methods are the only valuable, reliable or significant means of scientific advance. Data‐driven or ‘inductive’ advances in scientific knowledge are then seen as marginal, irrelevant, insecure or wrong‐headed, while the development of technology—which is not of itself ‘hypothesis‐led’ (beyond the recognition that such tools might be of value)—must be seen as equally irrelevant to the hypothetico‐deductive scientific agenda. We argue here that data‐ and technology‐driven programmes are not alternatives to hypothesis‐led studies in (...) scientific knowledge discovery but are complementary and iterative partners with them. Many fields are data‐rich but hypothesis‐poor. Here, computational methods of data analysis, which may be automated, provide the means of generating novel hypotheses, especially in the post‐genomic era. BioEssays 26:99–105, 2004. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionPiers H.G. StephensThis special issue of Ethics and the Environment is dedicated to the philosophical contributions of our founding editor, Victoria Davion, who launched the journal in 1996 and edited it until shortly before her death in November 2017. Vicky was a pioneering figure in ecofeminist philosophy, as well as being both the first woman to become a full professor and the first to be chair of the Philosophy (...) Department here at the University of Georgia. Naturally we have endeavored to give her a suitable tribute in this issue, which we hope you will appreciate.In addition to these achievements, Vicky developed and practiced a pedagogy that consistently complemented her philosophical perspective, and in the issue's opening piece, Cecilia Herles reflects personally on the enduring legacy and influence of Vicky Davion's teaching work, and the rich heritage that has flowed out of it for her students, encouraging egalitarian dialogue, interdisciplinarity, and a practicality that extended beyond the University and into the wider community. It is surely appropriate to begin our special issue with such an appreciation of the ways that Vicky touched and lifted up so many lives.These reflections are built upon in Chaone Mallory's essay, which takes Davion's key essay "Is Ecofeminism Feminist?" as its touchstone, examining that essay's vital influence on scholarship and activism as well as its key role in defining contemporary ecofeminism itself. Drawing upon Davion's arguments, Mallory tracks a series of vital questions for the development of the field. She demonstrates how Davion's early critical insights have helped sort the wheat from the chaff in dealing with concerns such as spirituality, irrationality, essentialism, and sexism within environmentalism, concerns that made ecofeminism questionable in some feminists' eyes, and she concludes with a positive exposition as to why "all feminisms, whether named this or not, should in some sense, be eco."From here we move to Ronnie Hawkins' extensive and detailed application of Davion's work to the neurobiological, cultural, and axiological roots of our contemporary ecological situation, in which Hawkins invokes [End Page 1] and applies the insights of Davion's 2002 essay "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective." Drawing upon Davion's inventive use of Val Plumwood's account of dualisms, Hawkins stresses Davion's pioneering work in avoiding the reason/nature dualistic fracture, and uses this work to critique the predominant current discourses of AI and neuroscience, in the process further expounding Davion's critiques of anthropocentrism and logocentrism. Cashing out the wider implications of Davion's perspective for our models of the mind, Hawkins connects these to Iain McGilchrist's recent work on the neuropsychology of perception and morality, arguing that this new account of the interaction of the two cerebral hemispheres and their role in generating an orientation to the world for cognition and valuing is consistent with Davion's insights, and can both help explain the environmental failings of modern Western culture and give support for non-instrumentalizing and nonanthropocentric alternatives.Finally, Trish Glazebrook and Emmanuela Opoku offer an extended ecofeminist examination of the roles, significance, dangers, and current status of environmental protectors in contemporary global environmental politics. In a paper dedicated to Davion that addresses many of her concerns with the interlocking character of forms of oppression, they systematically investigate and elucidate the importance of environmental protectors, the struggles that they engage in, the increasing threats of violence that they face, and their significance in the fight against climate change, ultimately arguing that the UN should extend explicit protection to land and environmental defenders under its human rights umbrella.We think these contributions are a fitting tribute to our founding editor, and offer you this special issue with the wish that her legacy will endure. [End Page 2]Copyright © 2018 The Trustees of Indiana University... (shrink)

in a stimulating and rich address, Brook Muller diagnoses some of the problems and challenges that our ecological crises bring to contemporary architecture, and attempts to break out of the conceptual straitjacket of modernism that he sees as contributing to the difficulty of producing original, promising solutions. In particular, he draws attention to the hugely pervasive role of Le Corbusier’s idea of the house as a machine for living in: here, he suggests, Le Corbusier’s enduring influence is manifested not (...) only in the “litany of environmental challenges associated with the legacy of the architectural machine” such as “climate change, massive species die-off, diminished air and water quality, and water and.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatic Environmentalism: Towards a Rhetoric of Eco-Justice by Shane J. RalstonPiers H.G. Stephens (bio)Pragmatic Environmentalism: Towards a Rhetoric of Eco-Justice Shane J. Ralston. Leicester, UK: Troubadour Publishing Ltd, 2013. Xxxv + 146 pages.But no word could protect the doctrine from critics so blind to the nature of the enquiry that, when Dr. Schiller speaks of ideas ‘working’ well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings (...) in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some similar ‘practical’ advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside the mental world also.(James, 1978: 267)Thus wrote an exasperated William James in The Meaning of Truth in 1910, attempting to refute the persistent misunderstanding of classical American pragmatism as being some form of reductive and technocratic epistemological capitalism. A century on and the misunderstandings rather depressingly continue in new contexts, most notably environmental philosophy, and we must ask “Why?” I suspect that this question has several interconnected answers: the popular non-philosophical associations of the word “pragmatism”; the mistaken tendency to equate pragmatism with runaway subjectivism; poorly informed impressions of the pragmatist criteria of “success” [End Page 123] and “workability”; and the misguided common assumptions, popularized in early environmental ethics work, that pragmatist schemes have no room for noninstrumental values (Leiss 1972; Rolston 1989; Hargrove 1989). The last of these continues despite scholarly refutations (Weston 1992; Minteer 2001; McDonald 2004; Stephens 2009 and 2012), and it is possible that a deeper reason for this obdurate resistance to pragmatist persuasion may lie in the philosophical history of persuasiveness itself. For as Shane Ralston observes in this book’s introduction, there is an intimate relationship between pragmatism and rhetoric, one which clashed with emergent Platonic ideas of truth during the very birth pangs of Western philosophy and may thus have led both to “a philosophical prejudice that rhetorical persuasion is inferior to philosophical logic” (xiv) and a related awareness that “the democratic spirit of rhetoric and its moorings in commonsense, everyday experience make it especially compatible with pragmatism” (xiv). Thus the mistaken tendency to equate philosophical pragmatism with the crassly opportunistic or the crudely populist, and the persistent failure to register pragmatist philosophy’s subtleties may well both have their roots in antique rivalries—Plato’s contrast of truth to mere popular opinion and his related condemnation of the Sophist rhetoricians. Ralston’s response to this problem is first to sensibly orientate his pragmatism to the philosophically sophisticated end of the spectrum and then employ it to enrich contemporary theory of rhetoric. He then attempts to demonstrate the potential of the new pragmatic rhetoric in a series of studies of particular areas of environ-mentalist contestation.Ralston’s variety of pragmatism is one that tries to largely eschew the generic popular associations of the word, and he notes the sensible distinction between the classical or paleo-pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey as against the contemporary neo-pragmatism of Rorty and others. Though Ralston claims to “combine elements of both classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism to highlight how pragmatism improves discursive practice” (xvii), in practice the most significant influence on the work appears to be Dewey, and this paleo-pragmatist reviewer was pleased to see that Ralston tries to avoid the tendency to play up the managerialist aspects of pragmatism in favor of “philosophical pragmatism’s other rich resources” such as “its fallibilism, experimentalism, and meliorism” (xxv). The aim of connecting up these pragmatist resources to rhetoric is to show that “a deeply pragmatic rhetoric, once introduced into environmental communication, has the potential to transform the way environmental activists speak about their [End Page 124] methods and goals, moving them toward what I call a rhetoric of eco-justice” (xxx), a rhetoric which can displace the current focus on value theory because it “offers a superior route toward advancing an agenda that preserves the natural environment and promotes ecological justice” (xxxi).In attempting to demonstrate these declared goals, the main body of the book is organized into five chapters. In Chapter 1, Ralston outlines and distinguishes two environmental rhetorics: a rhetoric of control and a... (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel's aesthetics, or philosophy of art, forms part of the extraordinarily rich German aesthetic tradition that stretches from J.J. Winckelmann's Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks and G.E. Lessing's Laocoon through Immanuel Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment and Friedrich Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man to Friedrich Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy and Martin Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art and T.W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. Hegel was influenced (...) in particular by Winckelmann, Kant and Schiller, and his own thesis of the “end of art” has itself been the focus of close attention by Heidegger and Adorno. Hegel's philosophy of art is a wide ranging account of beauty in art, the historical development of art, and the individual arts of architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry. It contains distinctive and influential analyses of Egyptian art, Greek sculpture, and ancient and modern tragedy, and is regarded by many as one of the greatest aesthetic theories to have been produced since Aristotle's Poetics. (shrink)

This self-published volume is a valuable and natural successor to Grosso’s earlier The Man Who Could Fly: St. Joseph of Copertino and the Mystery of Levitation, which I reviewed very favorably in JSE 30-2 (2016): 275-278. In the earlier work, Grosso presented the amazing essentials of the career of the Flying Friar, including some detailed descriptions from eyewitnesses extracted from contemporary sources (including Bernini). In this book, Grosso performs the additional valuable service of providing an abridged translation of the most (...) important contemporary biography of Joseph, a book brimming with compelling detailed eyewitness accounts, many taken verbatim during Joseph’s protracted inquisition. Details always matter, but perhaps more so in a case so remote from the present day and so extraordinary with respect to the magnitude of the reported phenomena. I remind the reader that the case of St. Joseph provides the earliest outstanding evidence for human levitation and quite possibly the best from any era. The levitations were observed by thousands of people, often near at hand, in flight (not simply at his destination) and in daylight. Moreover, the reports often converge on fascinating and unexpected striking details—e.g., that Joseph’s clothes would not move during his flights, or that he would not extinguish candles as he flew among them. Moreover, Joseph reportedly caused many dramatic healings (again, richly detailed in Bernini’s Vita), and his apparent feats of ESP and bilocation are likewise astounding and difficult to dismiss. So this volume takes us more deeply into the life and character of Joseph and regales us with a great deal more material about the phenomena themselves. In my view, this book is indispensable for students of macro-PK and spontaneous psi generally, and (needless to say) especially so for those who can’t read Bernini in Italian. (shrink)

Vision often dominates other perceptual modalities both at the level of experience and at the level of judgment. In the well-known McGurk effect, for example, one’s auditory experience is consistent with the visual stimuli but not the auditory stimuli, and naïve subjects’ judgments follow their experience. Structurally similar effects occur for other modalities (e.g. rubber hand illusions). Given the robustness of this visual dominance, one might not be surprised that visual imagery often dominates imagery in other modalities. One might be (...) surprised, however, that visual imagery often dominates perception in other modalities. This more controversial claim is motivated both by empirical data and by introspection. Some think of perception-perception visual dominance as epistemically good, holding that cases in which visual dominance misleads us (e.g. McGurk and rubber hand illusions) are cases in which the perceptual system resolves conflicts according to principles that are generally reliable. Here, we explore support for the more controversial claim that imagery-perception visual dominance is epistemically good. We suggest that, when the task is richly spatial, requiring for optimal performance the all-at-once identification of macro-spatial and allocentric properties (e.g. identifying the shape or location of a felt or heard object), the visual, whether perception or imagination, should dominate other modalities. Put another way, when identifying objects, one should go and look or, short of that, visually imagine candidate objects, and then follow the visual, even against conflicting perceptions from other modalities. For this broadly-typed category of of cognitive-perceptual task, vision does dominate and it should. (shrink)

Over the past decade or so within this journal, there have been critical debates concerning the role of mindfulness within education, the influence of neoliberalism on education in general and well-being interventions specifically, and the relevance of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger for critiquing modernity including the nature and purpose afforded education. In this article, we propose that these debates are sufficiently interrelated to develop a more unified argument. We will show how a Heideggerian perspective is conceptually rich, in (...) both its heritage, as it draws upon both East-Asian wisdom and western thinking, and its engagement, as it confronts the implications of what Heidegger called a ‘technical-era’, for offering such a unified critique. The focus of this critique is on instrumental forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘in’ education), which when framed by neoliberalism has rather narrow goals concerning individual well-being and performance. In contrast, more critical and integral forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘as’ education) offer the potential for more holistic and authentic learning. Throughout the article, we discuss how Heideggerian philosophy offers a number of useful concepts (e.g., enframing, Dasein, authenticity, meditative thinking), which are able to both critique the instrumentalisation of approaches like mindfulness by neoliberalism and speak to more holistic education oriented toward more authentic being in the world. (shrink)

This is the third volume of a three-volume set on The Innate Mind. The extent to which cognitive structures, processes, and contents are innate is one of the central questions concerning the nature of the mind, with important implications for debates throughout the human sciences. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Volume 3: (...) Foundations and the Future, concerns a variety of foundational issues, as well as questions about the direction of future nativist research. It addresses such questions as: What is innateness? Is it a confused notion? What is at stake in debates between nativists and empiricists? What is the relationship between genes and innateness? How do innate structures and learned information interact to produce adult forms of cognition, e.g. about number, and how does such learning take place? What innate abilities underlie the creative aspect of language use, and of creative cognition generally? What are the innate foundations of human motivation, and of human moral cognition? In the course of their discussions, many of the contributors pose the question : Where next for nativist research? Together, these three volumes provide the most intensive and richly cross-disciplinary investigation of nativism ever undertaken. They point the way toward a synthesis of nativist work that promises to provide a powerful picture of our minds and their place in the natural order. (shrink)

An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness.".

We investigate the provability or nonprovability of certain ordinary mathematical theorems within certain weak subsystems of second order arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the Cauchy/Peano existence theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, in the context of the formal system RCA 0 whose principal axioms are ▵ 0 1 comprehension and Σ 0 1 induction. Our main result is that, over RCA 0 , the Cauchy/Peano Theorem is provably equivalent to weak Konig's lemma, i.e. the statement that every infinite {0, 1}-tree (...) has a path. We also show that, over RCA 0 , the Ascoli lemma is provably equivalent to arithmetical comprehension, as is Osgood's theorem on the existence of maximum solutions. At the end of the paper we digress to relate our results to degrees of unsolvability and to computable analysis. (shrink)

A mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P. We say that P is strongly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P via a fixed Turing functional. The weak degrees and strong degrees are the equivalence classes of mass problems under weak and strong reducibility, respectively. We (...) focus on the countable distributive lattices P w and P s of weak and strong degrees of mass problems given by nonempty Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω . Using an abstract Gödel/Rosser incompleteness property, we characterize the Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω whose associated mass problems are of top degree in P w and P s , respectively. Let R be the set of Turing oracles which are random in the sense of Martin-Löf, and let r be the weak degree of R. We show that r is a natural intermediate degree within P w . Namely, we characterize r as the unique largest weak degree of a Π 1 0 subset of 2 ω of positive measure. Within P w we show that r is meet irreducible, does not join to 1, and is incomparable with all weak degrees of nonempty thin perfect Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω . In addition, we present other natural examples of intermediate degrees in P w . We relate these examples to reverse mathematics, computational complexity, and Gentzen-style proof theory. (shrink)

The evidence-based medicine movement advocates basing all medical decisions on certain types of quantitative research data and has stimulated protracted controversy and debate since its inception. Evidence-based medicine presupposes an inaccurate and deficient view of medical knowledge. Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge both explains this deficiency and suggests remedies for it. Polanyi shows how all explicit human knowledge depends on a wealth of tacit knowledge which accrues from experience and is essential for problem solving. Edmund Pellegrino’s classic treatment of (...) clinical judgment is examined, and a Polanyian critique of this position demonstrates that tacit knowledge is necessary for understanding how clinical judgment and medical decisions involve persons. An adequate medical epistemology requires much more qualitative research relevant to the clinical encounter and medical decision making than is currently being done. This research is necessary for preventing an uncritical application of evidence-based medicine by health care managers that erodes good clinical practice. Polanyi’s epistemology shows the need for this work and provides the structural core for building an adequate and robust medical epistemology that moves beyond evidence-based medicine. (shrink)

Let ω be the set of natural numbers. For functions f, g: ω → ω, we say f is dominated by g if f < g for all but finitely many n ∈ ω. We consider the standard “fair coin” probability measure on the space 2ω of in-finite sequences of 0's and 1's. A Turing oracle B is said to be almost everywhere dominating if, for measure 1 many X ∈ 2ω, each function which is Turing computable from X is (...) dominated by some function which is Turing computable from B. Dobrinen and Simpson have shown that the almost everywhere domination property and some of its variant properties are closely related to the reverse mathematics of measure theory. In this paper we exposit some recent results of Kjos-Hanssen, Kjos-Hanssen/Miller/Solomon, and others concerning LR-reducibility and almost everywhere domination. We also prove the following new result: If B is almost everywhere dominating, then B is superhigh, i. e., 0″ is truth-table computable from B ′, the Turing jump of B. (shrink)

Most clinicians take for granted a simple, reductionist understanding of medical knowledge that is at odds with how they actually practice medicine; routine medical decisions incorporate more complicated kinds of information than most standard accounts of medical reasoning suggest. A better understanding of the structure and function of knowledge in medicine can lead to practical improvements in clinical medicine. This understanding requires some familiarity with epistemology, the study of knowledge and its structure, in medicine. Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing (...) is advanced as the basis for developing a more accurate understanding of medical knowledge. Tacit knowing, which explores the taken-for-granted background knowledge that underlies all human knowing, is explained in detail with a focus on its relevance for clinical medicine. The implications of recognizing tacit knowing in medicine and medical decisions are discussed. These include the ability to explain the importance of the clinical encounter in medical practice, mechanisms for analysing patient and doctor as persons, and the need for humility given the uncertainty that the tacit dimension injects into all medical decisions. This more robust medical epistemology allows clinicians to better articulate the nature and importance of patient-centred care, to avoid pitfalls inherent in reductionist approaches to medical knowledge, and to think more clearly about the relationships between medicine and health care at the individual and population levels. (shrink)

Science and the End of Ethics examines some of the most important positive and negative implications that science has for ethics. Addressing the negative implications first, author Stephen Morris discusses how contemporary science provides significant challenges to moral realism. One threat against moral realism comes from evolutionary theory, which suggests that our moral beliefs are unconnected to any facts that would make them true. Ironically, many of the same areas of science (e.g. evolutionary biology, neuroscience, psychology) that present difficulties (...) for moral realism point to a new ethical approach that focuses on achieving some of the key practical goals shared by ethicists. Chief among these is how to increase amicable behavior among people. (shrink)

The thesis that scientists give greater weight to novel predictions than to explanations of known facts is tested against historical cases in physical science. Several theories were accepted after successful novel predictions but there is little evidence that extra credit was given for novelty. Other theories were rejected despite, or accepted without, making successful novel predictions. No examples were found of theories that were accepted primarily because of successful novel predictions and would not have been accepted if those facts had (...) been previously known. (shrink)

We investigate the reverse-mathematical status of several theorems to the effect that the natural number system is second-order categorical. One of our results is as follows. Define a system to be a triple A,i,f such that A is a set and i∈A and f:A→A. A subset X⊆A is said to be inductive if i∈X and ∀a ∈X). The system A,i,f is said to be inductive if the only inductive subset of A is A itself. Define a Peano system to be (...) an inductive system such that f is one-to-one and i∉the range of f. The standard example of a Peano system is N,0,S where N={0,1,2,…,n,…}=the set of natural numbers and S:N→N is given by S=n+1 for all n∈N. Consider the statement that all Peano systems are isomorphic to N,0,S. We prove that this statement is logically equivalent to WKL0 over RCA0⁎ source. From this and similar equivalences we draw some foundational/philosophical consequences. (shrink)

Let CKDT be the assertion that for every countably infinite bipartite graph G, there exist a vertex covering C of G and a matching M in G such that C consists of exactly one vertex from each edge in M. (This is a theorem of Podewski and Steffens [12].) Let ATR0 be the subsystem of second-order arithmetic with arithmetical transfinite recursion and restricted induction. Let RCA0 be the subsystem of second-order arithmetic with recursive comprehension and restricted induction. We show that (...) CKDT is provable in ART0. Combining this with a result of Aharoni, Magidor, and Shore [2], we see that CKDT is logically equivalent to the axioms of ATR0, the equivalence being provable in RCA0. (shrink)

If effective anti-aging interventions were achieved, they would likely bring about profound alterations in the experiences of individual and collective life. What if modern scientists could find the modern equivalent to the Fountain of Youth that Ponce de Leon sought? This book addresses this question by exploring the ramifications of possible anti-aging interventions on both individual and collective life. Through a series of essays, it examines the biomedical goal of prolongevity from cultural, scientific, religious, and ethical perspectives, offering a sweeping (...) view into the future of aging. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a system of nonstandard second-order arithmetic $\mathsf{ns}$-$\mathsf{WWKL_0}$ which consists of $\mathsf{ns}$-$\mathsf{BASIC}$ plus Loeb measure property. Then we show that $\mathsf{ns}$-$\mathsf{WWKL_0}$ is a conservative extension of $\mathsf{WWKL_0}$ and we do Reverse Mathematics for this system.

By , we denote the system of second-order arithmetic based on recursive comprehension axioms and Σ10 induction. is defined to be plus weak König's lemma: every infinite tree of sequences of 0's and 1's has an infinite path. In this paper, we first show that for any countable model M of , there exists a countable model M′ of whose first-order part is the same as that of M, and whose second-order part consists of the M-recursive sets and sets not (...) in the second-order part of M. By combining this fact with a certain forcing argument over universal trees, we obtain the following result : if proves X!Y with arithmetical, so does . We also discuss several improvements of this results. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore makes an epistemic argument for democracy. She contends that, due to their greater cognitive diversity, democratic groups will engage in superior deliberation and information aggregation than will groups of experts; consequently, the quality of their policies will be better. But the introduction of value diversity into Landemore's model—which is necessary if the argument is to apply to the real world—undermines her argument for the epistemic superiority of democratic deliberation. First, the existence of value diversity threatens (...) to stop deliberation prematurely. This has the effect of making the outcome of group deliberation more dependent on individual ability, which gives groups of experts a distinct advantage. Second, the introduction of value diversity raises the question of how to understand the standard of correctness of an epistemic argument, which Landemore does not adequately answer. (shrink)

Research on thermal “black-body” radiation played an essential role in the origin of the quantum theory at the beginning of the twentieth century. This is a well-known fact, but historians of science up to now have not generally recognized that studies of radiant heat were also important in an earlier episode in the development of modern physics: the transition from caloric theory to thermodynamics. During the period 1830–50, many physicists were led by these studies to accept a “wave theory of (...) heat”, although this theory subsequently faded into obscurity. (shrink)

We examine the concept of almost everywhere domination from the viewpoint of mass problems. Let AED and MLR be the sets of reals which are almost everywhere dominating and Martin-Löf random, respectively. Let b1, b2, and b3 be the degrees of unsolvability of the mass problems associated with AED, MLR × AED, and MLR ∩ AED, respectively. Let [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w be the lattice of degrees of unsolvability of mass problems associated with nonempty Π01 subsets of 2ω. Let 1 (...) and 0 be the top and bottom elements of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w. We show that inf, inf, and inf belong to [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w and 0 < inf < inf < inf < 1. Under the natural embedding of the recursively enumerable Turing degrees into [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w, we show that inf and inf but not inf are comparable with some recursively enumerable Turing degrees other than 0 and 0′. In order to make this paper more self-contained, we exposit the proofs of some recent theorems due to Hirschfeldt, Miller, Nies, and Stephan. (shrink)

A selective history of the benzene problem is presented, starting with August Kekulé's proposal of a hexagonal structure in 1865 and his hypothesis of 1872 that the carbon–carbon bonds oscillate between single and double. Only those theories are included that were accepted or at least discussed by a significant number of chemists. Special attention is given to predictions, their empirical tests, and the effect of the outcomes of those tests on the reception of the theories. At the end of the (...) period covered by this article, chemists generally accepted the valence bond theory proposed by Linus Pauling; some of them considered this a more sophisticated version of Kekulé's oscillation hypothesis. The sequel describes the replacement of the valence bond theory by the molecular orbital theory in the period ending around 1980. (shrink)

This is a comment on the paper by Barnes and the responses from Scerri and Worrall, debating the thesis that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers of (...) science employ, rather I describe how scientists themselves use facts and predictions to support their theories. I find wide variations, and no support for the assumption that scientists use a single ‘Scientific Method’ in deciding whether to accept a proposed new theory.Keywords: Predictivism; Novel predictions; Accommodation; Periodic law; Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev. (shrink)

Tube feeding is often presented as a nearly risk free and beneficial treatment for patients with dementia. But evidence shows that its benefits are illusory, while its risks are greater than many realize. Assisted oral feeding and good hospice care are better options.

SummaryIn the first part of the 19th century, geologists explained volcanoes, earthquakes and mountain-formation on the assumption that the earth has a large molten core underneath a very thin (25–50 mile) solid crust. This assumption was attacked on astronomical grounds by William Hopkins, who argued that the crust must be at least 800 miles thick, and on physical grounds by William Thomson, who showed that the earth as a whole behaves like a solid with high rigidity. Other participants in the (...) debate insisted that there is evidence for a fluid or plastic layer not far below the crust. It was also suggested that the interior of the earth is a supercritical fluid. By the end of the century many geologists had incorporated the doctrine of a completely solid earth into their theories. Acceptance of a relatively small liquid core, indicated by seismological research, was delayed for another two decades. (shrink)

The authority of the intact self over the future severely demented self is based on notions of integrity and precedent autonomy. Despite criticism of this authority, the principle of precedent autonomy in the care of people with Alzheimer disease or other progressive and irreversible dementias retains its moral significance.